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Recent Developments 
Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc.: 
Ina case of first impression, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), held that 
the First Amendment does not 
pose a bar to a finding of civil 
liability against a publisher in a 
state wrongful death action. 
While acknowledging that the 
U.S. Constitution does offer 
protection for speech representing 
the abstract advocacy of 
lawlessness, the court found that 
this shelter is not absolute and the 
speech engaged in by Paladin 
Press does not warrant 
protection. 
On March 3, 1993, James 
Perry ("Perry") murdered Mildred 
Hom, her eight year old 
quadriplegic son Trevor, and 
Trevor's nurse. Perry was hired to 
commit these murders by Mildred 
Hom's ex-husband, Lawrence 
Hom, who hoped to receive the 
two million dollars that his son 
received as settlement for the 
injuries which had left him 
paralyzed. In preparation for 
these murders, Perry closely 
followed the directions contained 
in Hit Man: A Technical Manual 
for Independent Contractors ("Hit 
Man") and How to Make a 
Disposable Silencer, Vol II, both 
of which are published by Paladin 
Enterprises, Inc. ("Paladin"). 
Upon discovering the pivotal 
role that Hit Man played in the 
execution of this crime, the 
relatives and representatives of 
the murder victims brought a 
wrongful death action against 
Paladin. The complaint alleged 
that Paladin aided and abetted 
Perry in the commission of these 
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murders through the publication of 
Hit Man with its explicit 
instructions on how to commit and 
cover-up a contract murder. The 
United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland granted 
Paladin's motion for summary 
judgment and held that the 
plaintiffs' claims were barred by 
the First Amendment as a matter 
of law. The plaintiffs appealed, 
and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals opened 
its opinion by quoting various 
passages of Hit Man that are 
representative of the instructions 
within its pages. Rice, 128 F.3d 
at 235-39. The court then 
specifically outlined how Perry, 
relying on these instructions, 
committed the murders and then 
attempted to cover them up. Id. 
at 239-241. 
Beginning its analysis, the 
court examined the distinction 
between protected speech and 
that which is afforded no 
constitutional protection. Id. at 
243-44. The court first referred to 
Brandenburg v. Ohio as the 
leading case recognizing that 
"abstract advocacy of lawlessness 
is protected speech under the 
First Amendment." Id. at 243 
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969». The court of 
appeals determined that this right, 
however, is not absolute. Id. at 
243. The court recognized that 
speech which "is tantamount to 
legitimately proscribable 
nonexpressive conduct may itself 
be legitimately proscribed, 
punished, or regulated .... " Id. 
In support of this, the court looked 
to two Supreme Court decisions. 
Id. In Giboney v. Empire Storage 
& Ice Co., the Supreme Court 
rejected "a First Amendment 
challenge to an injunction 
forbidding unionized distributors 
from picketing to force an illegal 
business arrangement." Id. (citing 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice 
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949». The 
court next cited Brown v. Hartlage 
as a recent example of the 
Supreme Court's decision not to 
allow a First Amendment defense 
when the activity sought to be 
protected involved illegal activity. 
Id. at 243, 244 (citing Brown v. 
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982». 
The court of appeals next 
analyzed whether the First 
Amendment posed a bar to 
liability for aiding and abetting a 
criminal offense. Id. at 244. In a 
case the court of appeals called 
"indistinguishable in principle" 
from the instant case, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the First 
Amendment "does not provide 
publishers a defense as a matter 
of law to charges of aiding and 
abetting a crime .... " Id. at 244 
(citing United States v. Bamett, 
667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982». 
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Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
previously held that the First 
Amendment offered no protection 
to speech which was not abstract 
in its criticism of tax law, but 
instead urged people to file false 
tax returns, with the expectation 
that this advice would be heeded. 
Id. at 245, 246 (citing United 
States v. Kelly, 769 F.2d 215,217 
(4th Cir. 1985». The court of 
appeals, through Barnett and 
Kelly, justified its analysis that 
speech which is found criminally 
liable may likewise be subjected 
to civil liability. Id. at 247. 
The court then identified two 
possible qualifications to this 
conclusion. Id. at 247. The first 
involved a "heightened 
intentrequirement" to prevent the 
punishment or abolishment of 
innocent and lawfully useful 
speech. Id. The court stated that 
in some contexts, foreseeability or 
knowledge that the offered 
information may be used for an 
improper purpose was not enough 
to impose liability. Id. The court 
then distinguished the case at bar 
from this exception by implying 
that liability is not absolved when 
"those who would, for profit or 
other motive, intentionally assist 
and encourage crime and then 
shamelessly seek refuge in the 
sanctuary of the First 
Amendment." Id. at 248. 
The second qualification 
identified by the court was that 
the First Amendment imposed 
similar limitations on the 
imposition of civil liability for 
abstract advocacy as it would for 
the imposition of criminal 
punishment for the same type of 
speech. Id. at 248-49. Because 
the court firmly believed that 
Paladin's speech was "so 
comprehensive and detailed" in its 
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narration and instruction on 
murder, the speech, under no 
circumstances could be 
considered abstract advocacy, 
and therefore this qualification 
was inapplicable. Id. at 249. After 
determining that the Supreme 
Court has left unprotected the 
type of speech Hit Man delivered, 
the court held "that the First 
Amendment [did] not pose a bar 
to the plaintiffs' civil aiding and 
abetting cause of action against 
Paladin Press." Id. at 250. 
Turning its focus to the 
analysis of Maryland law, the 
court of appeals next identified 
two errors committed by the 
district court when it ruled in favor 
of Paladin. Id. The first error was 
the district court's failure "to 
realize that Maryland does 
recognize a civil cause of action 
for aiding and abetting" at the 
time of its initial ruling. Id. at 250-
51. The court, after discussing 
the intent standard implicit in 
Maryland's aiding and abetting 
civil tort law, determined that 
Maryland would allow a cause of 
action in the instant case. Id. at 
251-52. 
Additionally, Paladin stipulated 
that it intended and had 
knowledge that Hit Man would be 
used by criminals to commit 
murder. Id. at 252-53. Moreover, 
Paladinconceded that it engaged 
in a marketing strategy to attract 
and assist these individuals in the 
pursuit of this information. Id. at 
253-54. Therefore, the court held 
that a reasonable jury could find 
that Paladin possessed the 
requisite intent under Maryland 
law as well as the heightened 
First Amendment standard. Id. at 
255. 
The second error identified by 
the court was the district court's 
misunderstanding of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Brandenburg. 
Id at 264. The court of appeals 
emphasized that Paladin's 
speech, because it was so 
detailed and methodical in its 
explanations and instructions on 
how to plan, commit, and cover-
up the crime of murder, was not 
abstract speech and therefore 
could be afforded no protection by 
the First Amendment. Id. at 256. 
In explanation, the court 
examined Hit Man chapter by 
chapter, and concluded that the 
book published by Paladin did not 
contain the character of speech 
that Brandenburg sought to 
protect. Id. at 262. 
By holding that the First 
Amendment would not shield 
Paladin from civil liability, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit clarified the distinction 
between speech that is afforded 
constitutional protection and that 
which is not. In stark and 
compelling language, the court 
found that Hit Man served no 
legitimate purpose but instead 
gave specific instructions on 
reprehensible criminal conduct. 
While the ramifications from this 
holding have yet to be seen, the 
court should be mindful of the 
slippery slope which it is 
approaching. The First 
Amendment is a fundamental 
principle of our constitutional 
system, and it allows for the free 
flow of ideas and discussion. In 
most circumstances, this privilege 
to speak ones mind occurs 
without the threat of legal 
repercussions. It is for these core 
constitutional values that, if not 
rigidly construed, this landmark 
decision will open avenues of tort 
liability many thought closed. 
